The UK & the UN: advancing nuclear non-proliferation

Article 26 of the UN Charter commits the Organisation and its member states “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s humanand economic resources”. A key pillar of the UN’s efforts in this endeavour is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - the cornerstone of the international regime for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,the regulation of technology associated with the development of such weapons, and the eventual attainment of global nuclear disarmament.

The NPT has achieved important successes since its entry into force in 1970; most notably, it has helped to defy predicted rates of nuclear proliferation. However, its capacity for constraining the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology has been put under pressure. In particular, an uncertain international environment and changing perceptions of security have led some states to lose confidence in the Treaty. Such a trend undermines the NPT regime and has negative consequences for the ability of the international community to prevent the misuse of nuclear energy: as the 2004 Report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change warns, “[w]e are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

In May 2005, the signatories to the Treaty will convene in New York for the NPT Review Conference, a major summit which is held every five years and which constitutes a key mechanism for appraising progress towards nuclear disarmament, identifying obstacles and finding solutions. Given the uncertainty currently characterising the non-proliferation regime, the May Conference is being viewed in many quarters as a defining point for the future of the NPT. It is therefore essential that the UK urges its international partners to seize this opportunity to ensure that support for the NPT is reaffirmed and that viable ways of overcoming challenges to its success are implemented.

A Framework for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
The NPT provides a framework that fixes nuclear non-proliferation at the core of world affairs and denotes a legally-binding commitment to nuclear disarmament. Ratified by 187 countries, it is the most comprehensively endorsed arms limitation and disarmament covenant, and supplies the basis from which all other related international agreements have evolved, such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As such, the NPT is a landmark treaty and a linchpin in the international structure for arms agreements.

In effect, the NPT functions as deal between those countries which, at the time of the Treaty’s foundation, hadnuclear weapons and those which did not. The NPT accordingly defines five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS): China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. Under Article VI of the Treaty, each NWS is obligated to pursue nuclear disarmament and is proscribed from assisting other states in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. In exchange, the remaining signatories, the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), are required to forego nuclear weapons and to accept the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inverifying that this obligation is being fulfilled. Under the terms of the Treaty, the NNWS are also granted access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Threats to the NPT
Given the gravity of the consequences certain to arise from abandoning the NPT, every attempt must be made to sustain and strengthen the regime by both acknowledging and addressing the Treaty’s shortcomings. A major reason for the doubt presently surrounding the NPT is the widespread perception of far-reaching alterations in the international security environment. Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director-General of the IAEA, has linked these alterations to three phenomena:

The challenges engendered by each of these phenomena have exposed serious fault lines within the NPT regime. It is particularly urgent that steps be taken to address the limitations of the NPT in dealing with the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors, and in preventing the illicit trade of nuclear material and technology.

Many NWS states have responded to the vulnerabilities generated by the current status of the international security environment by stalling nuclear disarmament and expressing an unwillingness to give ‘negative security assurances’ to NNWS countries through asserting the ‘non-use’ of nuclear weapons. This constitutes a direct violation of the fundamental premise of the NPT and threatens the disintegration of the non-proliferation regime as a whole – not least because it implies that nuclear weapons form an essential component of national security. This suggests that the NPT is peripheral and gives those states not party to the Treaty little reason to give up their existing nuclear weapons and forego plans to develop additional ones.

For varied reasons, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea remain outside the framework of the NPT. The refusal of these countries to support the NPT exacerbates already precipitous regional instabilities. It is clear that securing the support of these states for the NPT would do much to advance stability in their respective regions, thereby enhancing international security overall; hence the High-Level Panel’s recommendation “that negotiations to resolve regional conflicts include confidence-building and steps towards [nuclear] disarmament”. It is essential, furthermore, that the past repudiation of the NPT by these states is not viewed as a signpost signifying the NPT’s definitive demise but rather as a set of lessons for understanding the weaknesses of the regime and finding viable ways forward.

An important and necessary step is the reaffirmation of the need for disarmament by the NWS as a core element of non-proliferation. The last NPT Review Conference, held in May 2000, concluded a 13-step ‘Programme of Action’ which was widely commended for providing a systematic and progressive means of disarmament. Endorsed by all NPT signatories, it suggested an amplified political will for emphasising nuclear disarmament within overall strategies for reducing nuclear proliferation. However, the preliminary meetings leading up to the 2005 Review Conference, at which the 13 steps were effectively rescinded, have shown that this political will has been short-lived.

Moreover, the NPT is hampered by administrative failings which interrupt momentum between Review Conferences and stymie prospects for the successful implementation of solutions identified at these summits. The failure to achieve an agenda of any substance for this year’s review Conference is a case in point. Addressing the NPT’s institutional deficit would help resolve these issues and sustain constructive pressure on signatories to commit to agreements made at past Review Conferences.

Ways Forward
To address the body of problems discussed above, Dr ElBaradei has made a number of proposals for strengthening the NPT. These ’seven steps’ - none of which seeks to amend the NPT - encapsulate many of the major recommendations for the non-proliferation regime, out forward by both the High-Level Panel and, more recently, the Secretary-General in In Larger Freedom:

1. A five-year moratorium on the construction of facilities intended for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation